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Introduction
Traditional understandings of security in international relations have tended to rely on the assumption that
the referent object of security is the modern political state which needs to be secured against rival states and
other external threats. This conception relies heavily on the so-called security dilemma, the ever-present
threat that outside states might use their power to launch an attack. The driving force behind the security
dilemma has alternately been described as the anarchical nature of the international system and the aggressive
and competitive nature of human beings themselves. The classical realist scholars of international relations
(IR) rooted their arguments about human nature in philosophical and religious claims. It is only recently that
evolutionary science has been employed in an attempt to revitalize the realist project; it seems to have had
very little influence in shaping early disciplinary IR. Charles Darwin’s theories, however, have historically
been used to justify social competition and the contempt of difference and otherness.
Always the subject of controversy, and a staple of elementary science education, Darwin’s theories of
evolution are widely known – though they are not always popular and not always fully understood. Especially
in western popular culture, there is a common sentiment that in a ‘dog eat dog world,’ ‘only the strong
survive.’ Since the laws of nature operate based on ‘the survival of the fittest’ and so we must ‘kill or be
killed,’ ‘eat or be eaten.’ Popular understanding has envisioned natural selection as a reified force, choosing
from the most aggressive competitors and eliminating the weak. This has led to the widespread assumption
that surviving ‘successful’ individuals and cultures are fitter and therefore superior than their opponents.
Under this paradigm of biological and evolutionary determinism, it is not only implied that ‘might is right’
but that ‘whatever is, is right.’ This serves to justify modern social and political realities, and declare them
the only real options as determined through centuries of competitive selection. This encapsulates a view of
linear ‘progress’ that sees alternative schemes as unnatural and counter to human nature, and therefore
imprudent.
Despite being largely absent from formal arguments within IR, elements of evolutionary theory have such
a strong presence in popular consciousness that they undoubtedly influence thinking about the political
world. The first extensive use of evolutionary science to substantiate the classical realist view of human
nature emerged only recently, with the invocation of the scientific branches of sociobiology and evolutionary
psychology. As applied in IR, these arguments have sought to prove that violence, ethnocentrism, patriarchy
and competition are natural features of the human experience, thus creating the need for finding effective
responses to the ‘realities’ these truths impose. International relations as a scholarly field has been dominated
by a paradigm which sees conflict and the disharmony of difference as an inevitable feature of human nature,
and recent evolutionary arguments based on sociobiology have sought to reinforce this mode of thought.
Accepting the ‘scientific’ argument that human nature is naturally violent, ethnocentric, and competitive,
human nature promises to further entrench a conception of security which focuses on distinct, competitive
groups defined by their differences and prone to war.
Busser g Revisiting the Human Nature Debate in International Relations / 2
 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 5  edition. (New York: Knopf, 1978), p. 4.1 th
 Ulrik Enemark Petersen, “Breathing Nietzsche’s Air: New Reflections on Morgenthau’s Concepts of Power and2
Human Nature” Alternatives 24.1 (1999), p. 83
 Nietsche, Friedrich. Beyond Good and Evil. R.J Hollingdale, trans. (London: Penguin Books, 1990), p. 193.3
 Petersen, op cit, p. 102.4
Yet those who see human nature as aggressive, egoistic, and competitive do not have a monopoly on
scientific arguments. Competing interpretations of evolutionary evidence provide grounds for questioning
traditional assumptions and understandings about humanity’s potential to mediate difference, active
competition, conflict, and hierarchy. These alternate readings of the story of human evolution can open up
a space conceptualizing revolutionary ways of thinking about what security can mean between and within
states.
Realism in International Relations and Human Nature
The mainstream of the contemporary discipline of international relations still relies on key principles first
enunciated by scholars in the post-Second World War era. The arguments of the so-labelled classical realists
remain some of the defining concepts in IR and still shape the general orientation of scholarly study in the
field. Emerging victorious from the first of the discipline’s ‘great debates’, the realists provided theoretical
response to ‘idealist’ approaches such as those espoused by Woodrow Wilson in the interwar period. Two
of the most influential formulations of realist thought were authored by Hans Morgenthau and E.H.Carr, both
of whom objected to what they saw as idealism’s failure to take into consideration the underlying natural
laws that caused humankind to tend towards violence and aggression.
In Politics Among Nations, Hans Morgenthau argues that international politics is a natural struggle for power.
“Political realism,” Morgenthau famously suggests, “believes that politics, like society in general, is
governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature.”  Morgenthau’s specific depiction of1
human nature, following Nietzsche, is described as fundamentally evil and driven by a lust for power.2
Morgenthau’s citation of Nietzschean philosophy evokes one of the most famous passages of Beyond Good
and Evil: “Life itself is essentially appropriation, injury, overpowering of the strange and weaker,
suppression, severity, imposition of one’s own forms, incorporation and, at the least and mildest,
exploitation….”  Morgenthau therefore suggests that the human lust for power inevitably translates into an3
animus dominandi, or a desire to dominate.  Politics Among Nations, long received as a founding text in4
international relations, encourages students of world politics to accept this as objective, observable truth, and
thus to study power politics in the world ‘as it actually is.’
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For E.H. Carr in The Twenty Years’ Crisis, the ubiquitous thirst for power is similarly driven by a deep facet
of human nature. Despite his focus on human nature, Carr relies heavily on Darwin alone, commenting that
“when the harmony of interests was already threatened by conflicts of increasing gravity, the rationality of
the world was saved by a good stiff dose of Darwinism. The reality of conflict was admitted.”  Carr explains:5
“The exercise of power always appears to beget the appetite for more power. There is, as Dr. Niebuhr says,
no possibility of drawing a sharp line between the will to power and the will to live.”  Arguing that states6
are power-hungry entities and cannot be seen as morally responsible to each other, Carr draws on Hobbes’
conception of the Leviathan of the state as an Artificial Man, and also on thinkers like Machiavelli and
Hegel.  The Hobbesian social contract, the argument goes, redirects and translates the anarchy of pre-7
Leviathan society from the individual level to the international level, so that people forming political
communities accept global chaos in exchange for domestic peace. Classical realism thus sees states operating
in an anarchic realm that reflects Hobbes’ state of nature, which is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”8
For both Carr and Rienhold Niebuhr, whom he cites, the nature of states reflects the inherent nature of human
social groups. In Moral Man and Immoral Society, Niebuhr suggests that inter-group dynamics naturally
result in winners and losers, and so “conflict between the national units remains as a permanent rather than
a passing characteristic of their relation to each other.”  Niebuhr’s Christian Realism undoubtedly reinforced9
this conception of permanent conflict, firmly linking it to the doctrine of original sin. According to Annette
Freyberg-Inan, another side of Niebuhr’s argument is that “man’s quintessential experience as a mortal being
is a pervasive sense of insecurity. From this insecurity results over-defensiveness.”  The drive for power is10
magnified at the group and state level because, for many reasons, groups do not have the moral capability
of individuals. Niebuhr argues that the will to conquer death by amassing power informs an egoistic and
individualistic human nature. Niebuhr mirrors Nietzsche in this claim, although he argues from a theological
perspective that is quite separate from the will to power.
Most of the ‘fathers’ of international relations theory were men raised in the Judeo-Christian religious
tradition, and in many ways their work was explicitly and implicitly shaped by being situatied within that
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cultural context.  Although the theological elements of classical realist theory are not usually cited or built11
upon by contemporary scholars of international relations, a culturally-specific concept of ‘fallen man’ has
certainly continued to inform conventional international relations theory. However, as the formal study of
international relations continued, an explicit reliance on such culturally-specific assumptions and theological
claims began to pose problems for a discipline attempting to formulate principles that could be accepted as
rational, objective, and universal. In response to this problem, structural realists like Kenneth Waltz moved
the theoretical cause of the security dilemma up one level, framing it around the nature of the international
system itself rather than on the nature of humankind.
“Because of the difficulty of knowing such a thing as a pure human nature,” Waltz writes, “[and] because
the human nature we do know reflects both man’s nature and the influence of his environment, definitions
of human nature such as those of Spinoza and Hobbes are arbitrary and can lead to no valid social or political
conclusions.”  However, this caveat does not prevent Waltz from stating at the outset of the same volume:12
“Our miseries are ineluctably the product of our natures. The root of all evil is man, and thus he himself is
the root of the specific evil, war.”  This suggests that Waltz does not disagree with the classical realist13
human nature; it is merely that he believes it is not scientifically knowable and therefore cannot provide a
solid foundation for theory. Instead, he argues that it is more prudent to study the structural constraints that
encourage modern states and humans to vie for power, no matter what human nature might or might not be.
To a large extent, Waltz’s assertion has encouraged scholars of world politics to move away from explicit
claims about human nature. 
Yet the legacy of the classical realist conception of an egoistic and aggressive humanity is still reflected in
many ways in contemporary international relations.  A competitive and individualistic view of human nature14
still seems to underlie arguments about international politics, informing the key concept of the security
dilemma. Since humans are seen to lust for power and individual gain, no individual or group is secure from
the threat of ‘others.’ These others are different, alien, foreign, and are thus considered to be opposed.
Business as usual in contemporary international politics in general, and the state system in particular, relies
on the demonization of difference and the rejection and expulsion of the other in order to foster national
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identity and reify borders.  In contemporary international relations the main problematic is the potential for15
violence caused by a never-ending struggle for power by competing states, and the main solution is the
balance of power between those states. Difference is to be seen as a source of insecurity, to be excluded,
defended against, or reconciled. All of this relies, whether tacitly or expressly, on a specific conception of
humanity’s natural social predispositions.
Evolution, Egotism, and Domination
The second so-called great debate in the discipline of international relations was sparked as so-called
behaviouralist scholars argued that the realist theory needed to adopt greater methodological rigour in
supporting its claims. The behaviouralists argued that instead of employing philosophical, normative, and
qualitative methodologies, scholars of international relations should formulate precise definitions for
observable phenomenon so that claims could be tested and proven in a fashion similar to experiments in the
natural sciences. Given the desire to connect political science with the natural sciences, it should come as
no surprise that some scholars seeking methodological credibility have pointed to evolutionary theory as
providing the perfect intellectual and theoretical bridge between the two.
The invocation of evolutionary concepts to prove an egoistic and warlike human nature has been common
since the first publication of Charles Darwin’s evolutionary theories. The themes of competition, survival,
and victory that seemed to permeate Darwin’s work seemed to provide a truly scientific grounds for
theorizing an innate drive to battle. Yet Paul Crook argues that Darwin was no determinist, and that his work
stresses the human capacity to transcend the pressures of natural selection. It is therefore problematic, Crook
argues, for analysts “to read into Darwin’s work a necessary belief in a system of ethics chained to the
empirical contours of nature.”  Over the decades, however, this seems to be precisely what has happened.16
Popular understanding of Darwin’s core concepts is incomplete and imprecise to say the least, but the
interpretation of basic evolutionary arguments is influential.
While many people associate Darwin with the phrase “the survival of the fittest,” the phrase actually belongs
to Herbert Spenser, who resisted Darwin’s position that evolutionary theory provides no guidance for social
policy or ethics. While his ideas were published a few years before the Origin of the Species, Spenser is
generally seen as the originator of what is known as social Darwinism. Robert Bannister has suggested that
early social Darwinism was one of those interesting categories of thought in that while many thinkers were
given the label, it is almost never applied to oneself. The phrase quickly gained negative connotations. For
Bannister, the term ‘social Darwinist’ best applies to those who use the phrases natural selection, the survival
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of the fittest, struggle for existence, or who otherwise invoke Darwin’s ideas when making claims in matters
of social policy.  I will adopt this very loose definition.17
George Kateb suggests that although early social Darwinism in its pure form did not justify outright
exploitation, it asserted that inequality was natural, and that society was best served by letting individuals
thrive or fail. In its extended form, social Darwinism envisioned life as an unavoidable and natural struggle
between groups, leading to a justification of all manners of inter-group violence including, perhaps most
significantly, imperialist exploitation.  As Patrick Brantlinger has recounted, extinction discourse rooted18
in the naturalness of evolutionary arguments was especially utilized in justifying violence, and even
genocide, committed against aboriginal peoples during the imperialist era.  This violent evolutionary19
discourse affected the relations between states as well. Paul Crook suggests that Darwinian concepts were
construed as naturalizing war and imperialism, drawing up an evolutionary hierarchy which placed economic
and military powers in an entitled position at the top. Arguments that condoned violence as an inevitable part
of the natural world relied on mischaracterizations, or caricatures of the work of Darwin and his
contemporaries. However, Crook also contends that historians have underplayed the degree to which
Darwinian thought also inspired ‘peace biology,’ based on arguments that favoured Darwin’s holistic
ecology.  20
Darwin himself, under Bannister’s definitions, was no social Darwinist. He denied that the process of
evolution had a teleological drive towards a goal, or that it moved in a linear direction, which is a key
element in the argument that what evolutionary selection chooses is right and justified.  Despite using21
combative language in his writing, such as “the struggle for existence,” Darwin was unwilling to give priority
to themes of militarism and dominance in nature. In The Descent of Man he writes: “Although man, as he
now exists, has few special instincts… this is no reason why he should not have retained from an extremely
remote period some degree of instinctive love and sympathy for his fellows.”  In a chapter on the mental22
faculties of human beings, Darwin puts an emphasis on the unique role of memory, judgement, and feeling
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in constructing human social relations. He suggests, in one example, that a person saving a helpless victim
from a fire would not in the moment of pressure feel a utilitarian “happiness or pleasure” from behaving
altruistically, but might act almost thoughtlessly as if under the influence of a deeply planted social instinct.23
Still, responding to Herbert Spenser’s suggestion that moral intuition is inherited, Darwin suggests that while
many virtues may seem to be passed down genetically,
It appears probable… that they become first impressed on the mental organization through
habit, instruction, and example, continued during several generations in the same family, and
in a quite subordinate degree, or not at all, by the individuals possessing such virtues having
succeeded best in the struggle for life.24
It is perhaps ironic that an argument for the importance of human ‘nurture’ versus ‘nature’ is found in one
of the founding texts of evolutionary theory, but this is not a contradiction. It is merely a testament to the
complexities of evolutionary theory, as well as the difficulties with drawing conclusion for human behaviour
based on natural selection. According to Darwin, the forces of natural influences such as genetic
predisposition, sensory encouragement of behaviours, et cetera, in the evolution and development of human
beings by no means replace the importance of habit, intergenerational teaching, mimicry, and other social
influences.
Yet the inclusion of these arguments and caveats in Darwin’s own texts did not prevent his ideas from taking
on a life of their own. Popular interpretation of Darwin’s evolutionary theories has focused on themes of
aggression, active competitiveness, and egoistic struggle, translating the ‘survival of the fittest’ into an active
social and political directive. Joshua Goldstein points out that soon after the publication of Darwin’s work,
nineteenth-century social Darwinists used the misrepresentation and simplification of Darwinian thought to
further conservative political agendas by making claims to “unalterable biological realities.”  Evolutionary25
arguments have commonly been used in arguments expounding upon the ‘naturalness’ of war, social
hierarchies and laissez-faire economic systems. Each of these arguments resides within a tradition that views
competitiveness, particularism, and ethnocentrism as biologically-programmed human responses to
foreignness and difference.
In Primate Visions, Donna Haraway suggests that in evolutionary discourse reproductive bio-politics serve
as the paradigmatic condensation of a broad set of narratives about same and different, self and other, one
and many.  Haraway points out that traditional evolutionary biology’s bottom line conclusion regarding26
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difference is that non-identity is antagonistic; it poses a fundamental threat to the survival of cooperative
relationships: “In the end, only the sign of the Same, of the replication of the one identical to itself, seems
to promise peace.”  Primate Visions presents an effort to 27
facilitate revisionings of fundamental, persistent western narratives about difference,
especially racial and sexual difference; about reproduction, especially in terms of the
multiplicities of generators and offspring; and about survival, especially survival imagined
in the boundary conditions of both the origins and ends of history, as told within western
traditions of that complex genre.  28
Haraway attempts to re-tell and re-explore stories about the intersections between primatology and
anthropology, disturbing traditional common knowledges in an attempt to open up new interpretations that
will allow an expansion of possibilities for understanding the complex meanings of these narrative elements.
Sociobiology and International Relations Theory
Although social Darwinism declined in popular favour following the experience of the World Wars, the
twentieth century did not see the end of attempts to use evolutionary theory to explain social dynamics. In
the 1970s, sociobiology emerged as an attempt to explain human behaviour in terms of evolved genetic
predispositions. Edward O. Wilson, the ‘founder’ of sociobiology, defined it as “the systematic study of the
biological basis of all social behaviour.”  This branch of evolutionary theory has inspired some scholars of29
international relations to revisit classical realist arguments about human nature, setting aside Waltz’s
concerns and investing their confidence in evolutionary science. These scholars seek to combine elements
of rational choice theory with evolutionary arguments in an attempt to ‘prove’ claims that were previously
considered unknowable. This sentiment has been expressed in perhaps the boldest manner by Bradley Thayer
in a 2000 article in International Security.30
In arguing that an interpretation of evolutionary theory can strengthen the realist theory of international
relations, Thayer favours a revitalized form of classical realism, which steps away from theorizing structural
determinations of global anarchy and returns to the impact of human nature on international politics.
Following Edward O. Wilson, Thayer argues that advances in the field of sociobiology offer an opportunity
for “consilience” between the natural and social sciences. Sociobiology, a sub-discipline of evolutionary
theory, explores how the social behaviour of animals, including humans, is shaped by natural selection at the
genetic level. In particular, Thayer suggests that evolutionary science can offer a solid scientific ground for
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proving the validity of the two realist themes of natural human egoism and domination, leading to the
confirmation of a warlike human nature. In this argument, Thayer is not alone. R. Paul Shaw and Yuwa
Wong have similarly contended that evolutionary biology and sociobiology can offer an explanatory theory
of the human propensity for warfare.31
According to Thayer, the goal of evolutionary theory is to understand the ultimate causes of behaviour, and
because these causes are testable they provide a solid foundation for a realist approach to the study of
politics.  This description oversimplifies the goals of evolutionary science and conflates evolutionary theory32
writ large with the specific intentions and goals of sociobiology, a controversial field. Furthermore, Thayer
exaggerates the scientific consensus about sociobiology within evolutionary studies, as Duncan Bell and Paul
MacDonald have noted.  This is not a minor point, for while his argument seeks to unify the natural and33
social sciences, Thayer has selectively chosen his scientific sources (both social and natural), read them
selectively, and turned a blind eye to alternative explanations and interpretations. His article rests on two
major claims, both underpinned by arguable sociobiological evidence.
The first argument Thayer puts forward is that natural selection favours egoistic individuals over altruistic
ones. Following evolutionary theory, he recalls that a member of a species is relatively ‘fit’ in biological
terms if it is better able to survive and reproduce than other members of the same community or species. For
Thayer, this underscores the important concept of the ‘survival of the fittest.’ He suggests that since what
is most important is relative, not absolute fitness, it is only logical to emphasize a competitive aspect to
evolution within groups.“In a hostile environment where resources are scarce and thus survival precarious,
organisms typically satisfy their own physiological needs for food, shelter, and so on before assisting
others.”  34
Thayer conveys a simple version of basic principles within evolutionary science, but delves into a scientific
niche by incorporating Richard Dawkin’s controversial ‘selfish gene’ theory. Thayer asserts that because
selfishness in genes increased fitness, the same sort of selfishness has spread to behaviour patterns in modern
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animals, including humans.  Shaw and Wong, for example, suggest that altruism and nepotism can be35
explained through the concept of ‘inclusive fitness,’ wherein natural selection favours specific genes that
cause individuals to act on behalf of their gene pool. The authors use complex mathematical experiments to
construct models of evolutionary humankind and explain its likely behaviours as individualistic rational
choices.  36
The second argument in Thayer’s essay deals with domination and hierarchy. To prove classical realism’s
theory of a natural human tendency towards domination, Thayer points to the ‘dominance hierarchies’
observed in many social animals. The ubiquity of hierarchical, alpha-male-dominated social orders suggests
to Thayer that such a pattern of organization contributes to fitness because the alternative is perpetual
conflict over resources. Dominance hierarchies, he argues, avoid conflict because weaker members submit
resources to dominant members instead of engaging in costly conflicts.  According to Edward O. Wilson,37
humans naturally evolve a mental framework for engaging in dominance hierarchies. “Human beings,”
Wilson suggests, “Are absurdly easy to indoctrinate – they seek it.”  Thayer suggests that survival in a38
hostile world produces a fear of ostracism and a desire for the protection of a group, and argues that
conformity to a dominance hierarchy lowers conflict and keeps groups together. This, in turn, results in the
clash of opposing hierarchical societies.
The broad goal of Thayer’s paper is to unite his two arguments to demonstrate that universal biological
impulses drive human beings towards war. His argument revolves around the idea of an evolved human
antipathy towards difference. Thayer suggests that xenophobia and ethnocentrism would have been helpful
attributes to groups seeking to protect limited resources, and concludes that “given the contribution of
xenophobia and ethnocentrism to fitness during human evolution, ethnic conflict is likely to be a recurring
social phenomenon. Therefore ethnic conflict, like war and peace, is part of the fabric of international
politics.”  While Thayer acknowledges that culture and religion can dampen or exacerbate xenophobia and39
ethnocentrism, he still argues that these phenomena are an integral part of an evolved biological human
nature. In this he follows Edward O. Wilson, who has argued that war as we know it is the evolutionary result
of a phenomenon known as kin selection. This refers to the particular selective mechanism whereby genetic
relatives affect each other’s evolutionary fitness through interactions that make survival – of the relatives
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as well of the gene or trait encouraging such interactions – more likely. According to Wilson, the continual
processes of kin selection have encouraged warlike behaviours because of various competitive advantages
to violent ethnocentrism.  With this starting point, Thayer, Shaw and Wong attempt to explain a human40
propensity for warfare in terms of “central tendencies in aggression and lethal conflict, which [they] maintain
have been adapted to serve humans in hunter/gatherer groups for 99 percent of humanity’s existence.”  To41
prove this claim, Shaw and Wong attempt to formalize a cost-benefit analysis model supported by the
concept of inclusive fitness. Theoretical decisions are mapped out in terms of mathematical probabilities to
show how aggressive tendencies would lend individuals communities relative fitness and encourage such
traits to be passed along.
Responding directly to Thayer, Duncan Bell and Paul MacDonald have expressed concern at the intellectual
functionalism inherent in sociobiological explanations, suggesting that too often analysts choose a specific
behaviour and read backwards into evolutionary epochs in an attempt to rationalize explanations for that
behaviour. These arguments, Bell and MacDonald write, often fall into what Richard Lewontin and Stephen
Jay Gould have called ‘adaptionism,’ or “the attempt to understand all physiological and behavioural traits
of an organism as evolutionary adaptations.”  Arguments such as these are hand-crafted by their makers,42
and tend to carry forward their assumptions and biases. In an insightful article, Jason Edwards suggests that
sociobiology and its successor, evolutionary psychology, are fundamentally political because they frame their
major questions in terms of an assumed individualism. Edwards suggests that the main question in both sub-
fields is: “given human nature, how is politics possible?”  The problem is that the ‘givens’ of human nature43
are drawn backward from common knowledges and truths about humans in society, and the game-theory
experiments which seek to prove them are often created with such assumptions in mind. These arguments
are seen by their critics as politicized from the very start. Sociobiology in particular has been widely
interpreted as a conservative politico-scientific tool because of these basic assumptions, and because of the
political writings of many sociobiologists.  Because sociobiology naturalizes certain behaviours like44
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conflict, inequality and prejudice, Lewontin et al. suggest that it “sets the stage for legitimation of things as
they are.”45
The danger inherent in arguments that incorporate sociobiological arguments into examinations of modern
political life, the authors say, is that such arguments naturalize variable behaviours and support
discriminatory political structures. Even if certain behaviours are found to have a biological drives behind
them, dismissing those behaviours as ‘natural’ precludes the possibility that human actors can make choices
and can avoid anti-social, violent, or undesirable action.  While the attempt to discover a genetically-46
determined human nature has usually been justified under the argument that knowing humankind’s basic
genetic programming will help to solve the resulting social problems, discourse about human nature seems
to generate self-fulfilling prophesies by putting limits on what is considered politically possible. While
sociobiologists tend to distance themselves from the naturalistic fallacy that ‘what is’ is ‘what should be,’
there is still a problem with employing adaptionism to ‘explain’ how existing political structures because
conclusions tend to be drawn in terms of conclusions that assert what ‘must be’ because of biologically-
ingrained constraints.  Too firm a focus on sociobiological arguments about ‘natural laws’ draws attention47
away from humanity’s potential for social and political solutions that can counteract and mediate any
inherent biological impulses, whatever they may be.
A revived classical realism based on biological arguments casts biology as destiny in a manner that parallels
the neo-realist sentiment that the international sphere is doomed to everlasting anarchy. Jim George quotes
the English School scholar Martin Wight as writing that “hope is not a political virtue: it is a theological
virtue.”  George questions the practical result of traditional realsist claims, arguing that the suggestion that48
fallen man’s sinful state can only be redeemed by a higher power puts limitations on what is considered
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politically possible. Thayer’s argument rejects the religious version of the fallen man for a scientific version,
but similar problems remain with his ‘scientific’ conclusions. 
Examining Sociobiological Realism
The political and philosophical debates that surround sociobiology in general are the least of the problems
with Bradley Thayer’s article. In fact, Thayer’s argument is exactly the sort of reading of sociobiology about
which its critics like Lewontin and Gould have been uncomfortably anticipating. Worse, Thayer’s exercise
demonstrates a misreading of many evolutionary arguments drawing conclusions with which the theorists
he cites would likely distance themselves. His argument about an egoistic human nature relies on a
tiresomely common oversimplification of “a classic Darwinist argument,” crudely linking natural selection
to the assumption that selfishness encourages evolutionary fitness; Even Thayer feels the need to qualify this
argument in a footnote.  Thayer’s citation of Richard Dawkins’ selfish gene theory to provide “the second49
sufficient explanation for egoism” is also incredibly problematic.  In The Selfish Gene, Dawkins suggests50
that at the beginning of micro-organic life genes that promoted survival were key to making basic life-forms
into simple ‘survival machines.’ Rather than viewing genes as an organism’s tool for generating, Dawkins
suggests that it is wiser to look at the development of complex organisms as genes’ method of replicating
themselves. The word selfish is used as a shorthand to describe a more complex phenomenon: genes that give
their organic vessel advantages in survival and reproduction are successfully transmitted into future
generations.  51
However, an important part of Dawkins’ work is that the ‘selfishness’ of genes translates into decidedly
unselfish behaviours. Dawkins himself has had to distance himself from groups who interpreted his focus
on kin selection as a reification of ethnocentrism:
The National Front was saying something like this, “kin selection provides the basis for
favoring your own race as distinct from other races, as a kind of generalization of favoring
your own close family as opposed to other individuals.” Kin selection doesn’t do that! Kin
selection favors nepotism towards your own immediate close family. It does not favor a
generalization of nepotism towards millions of other people who happen to be the same
color as you.52
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In light of a careful consideration of the intricacies of Dawkin’s thinking, Thayer’s treatment of his theories
seems remarkably crude and shallow. Broad conclusions seem to materialize as if from thin air: “In general,”
Thayer writes, “the selfishness of the gene increases its fitness, and so the behaviour spreads.”  This line,53
crucial to Thayer’s point, is such a brazen oversimplification and misinterpretation of Dawkin’s work that
Thayer’s arguments about a provable natural human egoism are rendered essentially baseless in terms of
scientific evidence.
Thayer’s argument about the ubiquity of hierarchical structures of power rely on a dichotomous hypothetical
choice between eternal conflict and structures of dominance. The suggestion that the ubiquity of male-
dominated hierarchies ‘contributes to fitness’ in the present tense comes dangerously close to naturalizing
and reifying patriarchal structures of human social organization.  As presented, the argument reads very54
much like Hobbes’ Leviathan, in which pre-social actors sought the refuge and protection of a larger social
order. In many ways, Thayer seems to be reconstructing the Leviathan using sociobiology rather clumsily
to justify broad generalizations. It is certain that some mix of biology and culture have led to male-dominated
cultures in the past, and there is a strong basis for the argument that humans have developed a need to belong
to social groups. It is also clear that humans have the mental capacity to understand and technologies for
operating within dominance hierarchies. Yet these possibilities together do not suggest, contrary to Thayer’s
argument, that “humans readily give allegiance to the state, or embrace religion or ideologies such as
liberalism or communism, because evolution has produced a need to belong to a dominance hierarchy.”  If55
humans do depend on social connectedness, must this necessarily come in the form of hierarchical,
patriarchal structures? The case is not made convincingly. As I shall discuss below, alternate understandings
of the connection between basic human needs, human culture, and environmental stresses can provide an
understanding of dominance hierarchies that does not naturalize their ubiquity.
Beyond the problems with the scientific evidence behind Thayer’s ontological claims, there are also problems
with his proposed epistemological project of consilience. Using sociobiology to unite the social and natural
sciences (and to give bases to a revitalized classical realism) would depend on achieving a near omnipotence,
where known genetic programs could be weighed against known environmental influence, using science to
predict the results. At the outset of his essay, Thayer implies that science is progressing at a rapid pace
towards making this a reality. Yet evolutionary explanations for specific behaviours become incredibly
problematic given all of the possible factors and externalities which might have affected evolutionary
outcomes, all of which are impossible to map into even the most complex mathematical theoretical games.
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Bell and MacDonald point out that many biologists dispute whether sociobiology can offer useful
commentary on humans “because of the central role of culture, language, and self-reflexivity in determining
human behaviour.”  Similarly, in response to Shaw and Wong, Joshua Goldstein cites evidence that human56
beings do not demonstrate an inherent tendency towards aggression, instead displaying cooperation more
often. Goldstein offers the possibility that human behavioural traits like aggression, altruism, and sacrifice
are shaped more by cultural transmission than by genes. This possibility enormously complicates the attempt
at consilience intended by Thayer and his contemporaries, by adding in incalculable variables that come with
social and cultural interactions.  57
Because of these complications, Lewontin, Rose, and Kamin have asserted that sociobiology’s grand
argument is discredited since no aspect of human social behaviour has ever been linked to a specific gene
or set of genes.  As Mary Clark observes, one of the major results of the human genome project was the58
falsification of the supposition that each protein produced in a human cell was coded by a separate gene. In
fact, genes often work interdependently, with the same gene recurring along the chromosome and causing
different outcomes depending on its position and neighbouring genes. Clark describes the complex signals
and activations which occur at the genetic level, concluding that rather than a linear unidirectional blueprint,
the human genome is more like an ecosystem, and can be responsive to its microscopic – and perhaps even
the macroscopic – environment.  59
Just how important are the influences culture, social behaviour, and environment to the human condition,
as distinct from biological programming? In many caveats and footnotes within Thayer’s own argument, he
includes statements that acknowledge the importance of cultural factors in the shaping of modern human
societies. If all behaviour cannot be explained by sociobiology and other evolutionary arguments because
behaviours are contingent on cultural and environmental factors, how strong is the scientific support for
Thayer’s revived realist project? As Bell and MacDonald have suggested, many of the scientific foundations
Thayer employs to support his epistemological program are indeterminate because they cannot explain when
cultural or environmental factors will play a role.   On the ontological side, Thayer certainly comes a long60
way from proving that human nature is defined by and limited to egoism and dominance, as he had intended
to do. If knowledge borrowed from evolutionary biology and other natural sciences suggests that culture and
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environment play a significant role in shaping human behaviours, then it may not be the realist project that
is best supported by a deep and sustained interdisciplinary exploration.
Human Needs and Social Potential
Citing evolutionary Science does not truly support ‘realist’ narratives and explanations of egoistic
competition in human society, despite the fact that over the years it has often been cited by those wishing
to make such cases. There is plenty of evidence in evolutionary science for explaining why biology is not
destiny, and in fact, for unsettling any claim about an evolutionarily-derived ‘human nature’ that underlies
political life. In her book In Search of Human Nature, Mary E. Clark has suggested that instead of a human
nature defined by genetically programmed instincts, predispositions and drives, it is more useful to discuss
a human nature in terms of universal needs. These needs, she argues, are as close to a ‘human nature’ as we
humans have, since their fulfilment is necessary as a result of complex development. Clark suggests that
human beings have basic biological and psychological needs for bonding, for autonomy, and for meaning.
Bonding with a social group, Clark says, is an evolved human propensity that was necessary for survival
during our evolution, and which also became indispensable because of other biologically evolved traits.
Situating her evolutionary arguments in the context of the Pleistocene era, she suggests that biological
changes in the evolving human body demanded social changes as well. For example, as the primate brain
grew in size, the birth canal could not enlarge to accommodate it. This meant that as primate intelligence
evolved and increased, selective pressures encouraged primate children to be born increasingly premature,
thus experiencing more and more of early childhood development outside of the womb. This, Clark argues,
meant that natural selection favoured mutually supportive group behaviour.  A large brain therefore co-61
evolved with an interdependent social lifestyle. However, this is not a repeat of the sociobiological emphasis
on inclusive fitness. Clark argues that not only individuals, but also groups were selected for traits during
the most crucial phases of primate evolution. Culture became the most critical adaptation for survival in the
Pleistocene as group living became vital not only to the survival of individual members, but also to the
survival of the group as a whole. Communication skills and their social use became critical to survival.
“Shared group intelligence,” Clark suggests, “independent of genetically determined behaviours, promotes
the survival of groups, and hence of all their members.”62
While social bonding is a fundamental need, human beings also need the autonomous freedom to act
individually to establish an identity. Clark suggests that this need was established during human evolution,
when children would need a degree of freedom in order to experience the environment and independently
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learn how to survive.  The need for autonomy, Clark insists, does not translate into a genetic predisposition63
towards egoistic individualism. She criticizes Machiavellian interpretations of evolutionary science, arguing
that ultra-Darwinians overemphasize the ubiquity of dominance hierarchies.  Much of the science that64
supports the Hobbesian view of human nature, Clark argues, is based on studies of primates conducted under
obtrusive conditions and in artificial environments. When scientific observers have developed less invasive
methods for observing primates in their natural habitat, far different results were recorded where primates
were seen as more peaceful, cooperative, and conciliatory. Much of the conflict, aggression, tendencies
towards dominance and violence observed in primate societies, Clark writes, is the result of irregular stresses
upon the individuals and the group as a whole, often posed by scientists conducting their studies.  Neither65
neo-Hobbesian sociobiologists nor the rational game theorists have correctly envisioned primate nature in
its complexities, Clark asserts. 
The intersection between the basic human needs for bonding and autonomy offers a space for understanding
complex behaviours and social arrangements. Citing extensive ethnographic evidence, she suggests that
primates have the potential for both dominance hierarchies and for egalitarian co-existence, and that the
determining factor is the level of stress experienced by a group. When individuals are allowed autonomy
within the context of meaningful group bonding, she argues, hierarchies are less likely to emerge.  The66
implication is that the conflict-driven hierarchies that observers like Thayer believe to be an unavoidable part
of human and primate nature are instead contingent upon environmental and social circumstances, being
merely the result of a failure to fulfil basic needs.
The third basic human propensity, Clark suggests, is for the creation of meaning. The evolved human ability
to conceive of meaning in the world, according to Clark, has been of prime importance to the survival of
groups. Communication has been critical to group survival in many ways. Shared cultural stories are key to
the coherence of groups, and individual growth depends on them. The specific stories within cultures
structure the existence of societies and provide standards of humanity by which members evaluate their
actions. Because they are important, human beings actively defend their meaning systems from threats, and
result in conflict between groups over meaning systems.  Furthermore, Clark argues, the particular meaning67
system embraced by a society can help to shape survival strategies and responses to potential stresses:
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“Whether a given culture becomes extinct or successfully adapts depends less on what causes the stresses
it experiences than on how those stresses are interpreted and responded to. In other words, its beliefs are
more significant than its circumstances.”68
Freedom and Security
Perhaps Clark’s most significant arguments for political scientists is her argument that within social groups,
conflict and aggression can be mitigated by finding a way to allow members the freedom to fulfil the basic
needs of bonding, autonomy, and meaning. “A healthy society,” Clark writes, “meets basic human needs in
a balanced way, and therefore coercive controls are unnecessary.”  Human beings, having rapidly evolved69
relatively recently, are far from cohesive and consistent machines. Clark suggests that modern humans
contain a large degree of internal genomic conflict, having unfinished evolutionary patterns and processes
built into us which natural selection has not removed. This explains many conflicting tendencies, Clark says,
including the opposite desires for bonding and autonomy.  Finding a way to balance these human needs has70
been, and remains, the most effective way to avoid conflict and encourage survival. Rather than genetic
dispositions towards egoism or even quasi-egoistic altruism, it was the traits of flexibility, quick learning,
problem solving, and the sharing of knowledge that were the most important adaptive qualities in the
Pleistocene.  If there is a human nature, Clark argues, it is characterized not by genetic programming but71
by a natural flexibility and an ability to be adaptive.
Thus, in contrast to sociobiologists who seek to explain politics in terms of human nature, Clark argues in
favour of the reverse. Thus the challenge that emerges from Clark’s analysis is similar to that called for by
Jason Edwards, who suggested that rather than using an assumed human nature to explain the political, it is
more important to ask how social, cultural, and political forces have shaped not only human, but primate
evolution.  An exploration along these lines is of vital importance because, as Clark writes, “How a culture72
perceives human nature determines the way its people behave.”  If organized war, she suggests, first erupted73
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from clashes over competing meaning systems, then one of the surest ways to avoid conflict is to find ways
to allow such differences to coexist.  Not only is this possible, Clark argues, but it happens. 74
It is extremely important to realize that many, many societies have existed (and still do) that
have managed to provide fully satisfying and meaningful cultural narratives without
becoming exclusive! The “Other” is not ubiquitously present as a threat. When strangers
from unknown cultures are encountered, they are tolerated, treated as any traveler is, with
hospitality and respect.  75
Clark cites Kenneth Boulding, who has identified three major avenues, or facets of power, through which
human societies have utilized in order to establish social control over the chaotic and varied impulses of
human nature. These three avenues are legalized organized violence, economic power and control, and love.
While perhaps a loaded word, love in this instance stands for the power that mutual trust, understanding,
shared meaning, and compassion exert over a person’s behaviour in a social group. The ratio of how these
are employed, Clark argues, depends on a society’s cultural narrative and assumptions about human nature.76
Clark describes the African concept of ubuntu or botho, which carries a range of virtuous meanings. Clark
relays Archbishop Desmond Tutu’s explanation of the concept’s essence: “My humanity is caught up, is
inextricably bound up, in yours… A person is a person through other persons… I am human because I
belong. I participate. I share.”  For differences to coexist peacefully, Clark suggests, it is necessary to build77
societies that foster recognition of the connectedness of the human experience and the value of difference.
“The only compromise (if we must call it that) is to accept the possibility of – and then give respect to –
beliefs different than one’s own.”  The focus on human propensities and needs put forward here lays out78
a framework for thinking about social and political problems by paying attention to the underlying stresses
which result from people’s lack of freedom. When human beings are freely able to negotiate their social
bonds, their autonomous movements, and to invest in meaning systems, they have the potential for peaceful
and harmonious living. Key to this argument is a political ethic of difference, where Otherness is not only
tolerated, but embraced and respected. Clark may not necessarily see this as an ethical assertion. Her book
is constructed upon scientific evidence (however contested) and the concluding remarks are framed in terms
of a practical argument. Human beings have evolved the psychological, biological, and intellectual tools for
social interaction, which provide the potential for peace and for conflict. Alternate outcomes depend on
which meaning systems are adopted in a culture. Some particular meaning systems add stress, disrupting the
Busser g Revisiting the Human Nature Debate in International Relations / 20
 See George, “Realist Ethics”; David Campbell, National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity and Justice in Bosnia79
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998); David Campbell and Jim George, “Patterns of Dissent and the
Celebration of Difference: Critical Social Theory and International Relations” International Studies Quarterly 34.3
(1990), pp. 269-93.
 George, “Realist Ethics,” p. 199.80
 Campbell, National Deconstruction, p. 169, 205-6.81
basic human needs as discussed above, and leading to conflict. The most valuable and lasting way to ensure
peace and stability, Clark asserts, is to adopt social frameworks wherein different systems of meaning can
co-exist without hierarchy.
Clark’s message resonates quite closely with recent theoretical writing in the international relations subfield
of critical security studies. Recent postmodernist-poststructuralist scholars like Jim George and David
Campbell have advanced an approach to international ethics which mirrors many of the same intellectual
impulses that seek to find ways to favour approaches and outlooks that embrace difference rather than
expelling and confronting it.  In fact, by developing this argument from a scientific point of view, Clark79
offers a complementary piece to the puzzle, albeit from what is perhaps an unlikely direction. Her argument
connects with these writings in two ways. First, it offers support for a concept of radical interdependence,
and second, it does so in a way that does not seek a totalizing discourse or a ‘meta-narrative.’
Jim George has challenged the ‘egoism-anarchy thematic’ he sees as dominating the conceptualization of
ethics in international relations theory. Targeting classical realists like Morgenthau, Niebuhr, and Waltz,
George suggests that this thematic has been reinforced by the realist presentation of pessimistic views of
human nature, as described earlier.  Bradley Thayer injects this egoism-anarchy thematic heavily into his80
sociobiological arguments. In National Deconstruction, Campbell, writing in the aftermath of the Balkan
conflicts and international interventions, has argued that this egoistic conception of ethics contributes to an
international political atmosphere where state-centric political communities are seen as the only legitimate
form of political organization. The received view suggests that struggles involving issues of identity and
culture can only be solved by creating territorial barriers and encapsulating differences in bordered spaces.
Multiculturalism, when it is employed, is presented as a social mechanism for homogenizing differences and
encouraging ‘tolerance’ as opposed to ‘respect.’81
In traditional approaches to security, the authors argue, differences are something to be reconciled, translated,
and erased. Tolerance is held up as a virtue, but tolerance only demands one to turn a blind eye to differences
and to avoid conflict. According to observers like Thayer the tendency to detest difference is rooted in human
genetics, the result of evolutionary selection. For Niebuhr, it was sinfulness and for Morgenthau it was the
animus dominandi. Even where the ‘natural’ repulsion of difference does not result in violence, difference
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must be managed. The theoretical other, under this ethical paradigm, is understood by projecting one’s own
identity onto her or him and turning differences into similarities. “Consequently,” George writes, “the
purpose of knowing the other in ethical terms becomes a process of control.”  This seems to be an automatic82
response stemming from the ubiquity of a dominant paradigm that focuses on egoistic unitary rational actors,
as implied by realist interpretations.
Both George and Campbell frame an alternative ethical basis for interaction in terms of inter-subjectivity and
interdependence. They see the tendency to reject and detest difference as far more socially contingent than
it is natural or unavoidable. For inspiration, they turn to the writing of Emmanuel Lévinas, whose ethical
ideas portray being human as an inherently interdependent experience. Lévinas’ concept of radical
interdependence suggests that human beings are endlessly responsible to their others because it is only by
relation to another that an individual can define herself or himself.  While traditional ethics always takes83
place in a self/Other opposition, Campbell and George use Lévinas’ ideas to suggest that other approaches
are possible. George quotes Foucault, who suggests that the best alternative scheme is to “disavow one’s
modernist God-like status and seek not to speak from universalist certitude, for others, but to utilize one’s
particular capacities to help others speak for themselves.”  84
Using this approach, it may be possible to conceive of political solutions and conceptual frameworks that
escape the egoism-anarchy thematic. George envisions “an engaged post-modern politico-ethical perspective
concerned to open up closed discursive practices to the creativity and critical capabilities of peoples seeking
to understand and change their worlds in their own ways and through their own struggles.”  Similarly,85
Campbell suggests that pursuing this type of thinking will assist in “Developing political modes and
strategies through which our responsibility to the other can be democratically if imperfectly realized, and
articulating conceptions of community that refuse the violent exclusions and limitations of identity
politics.”  These ideas reflect in many direct ways the values expressed in Mary Clark’s concluding86
chapters. The concept of ubuntu she describes, for example, corresponds very closely with Lévinas’ concept
of radical interdependence, grounding individual subjectivity firmly in connection with social relationships.
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For Lévinas, this is a metaphysical prerequisite of being; for Clark it is a part of our biological and
psychological needs as humans.
An examination of Clark’s arguments about human needs and their importance in healthy social structures
can provide a ‘scientific’ counterpart to Lévinas’ assertions of radical interdependence as a universal
phenomenon. On a certain level, Lévinas’ philosophy must be accepted or denied: he presents a series of
claims about the nature of subjectivity and the implications for social life which the reader must evaluate.
While philosophically rich, Lévinas’ statements may leave some thoughtful readers, even sympathetic ones,
questioning on what basis to accept his assertions as true. Read together, Clark’s science complements
Lévinas’ metaphysical and philosophical ideas with very similar concepts, rooted instead in the basic human
need for bonding and meaning as explored through psychology and evolutionary theory. She offers what
might be, to some students of international relations theory, a more grounded explanation for why the ideas
of Lévinas (and then perhaps Campbell and George) can and should be accepted. The later chapters of
Clark’s book describe in everyday terms how ‘egalitarian’ societies can function without excluding,
reconciling, or ranking differences.
Of course, the suggestion that Clark ‘backs Lévinas with science’ may be uncomfortable and problematic
for some readers, especially those who favour post-modern and poststructuralist approaches to the study of
security. Such approaches differ from traditional approaches because they question the ontological and
epistemological bases for the knowledge claims that are prevalent in traditional work. Poststructuralist
thinkers in international relations are especially critical of ‘meta-narratives’ or overarching intellectual stories
that presume to give an orderly, linear, and positivist account of complex phenomena.  Campbell and George87
have advocated an approach to political thinking that “involves a rejection of all attempts to secure an
independent foundation, or Archimedean point, from which to orient and judge social action. It stresses
instead the need to ground all knowledge of social life in human history, culture, and power relations.”88
While academic interdisciplinarity or non-disciplinarity is often understood as a virtue, advocates of
postmodernist and poststructuralist approaches critique the imperial pretences of positivist science especially
those that seek to universalize. Bradley Thayer’s invocation of Edward O. Wilson’s theory of consilience
attempts to create exactly the sort of positivist meta-theory to which poststructuralist and postmodernist
writers object. By relying on purportedly objective scientific approaches to establish a master narrative that
can unite the social and natural sciences, Wilson’s consilience theory represents an example of the
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overzealous rationalism that typifies the modernist paradigm.  Sociobiology in general carries forward what89
post-positivist theorists see as the problematic attempt to create a unified science by drawing on knowable
universals.
It is trickier to make these same criticisms of Clark because she does not make similar claims to objective
truths. Her use of scientific arguments, rather than providing an ultimate theory of human behaviours,
demonstrates that universal claims are unhelpful and cause intellectual distortions. By focusing on human
needs but emphasizing that these needs are filled in endlessly different ways across cultures, Clark’s
conceptual prioritization of human needs rather than human nature opens up a space for exploring meaningful
political solutions that allow for possibility of social arrangements that do not require the erasure and
reconciliation of difference or the sacrifice of autonomous freedoms.
Conclusions
Unfortunately for Bradley Thayer, evolutionary arguments do not provide a simple and incontestable
ontological and epistemological foundations for revitalized realism. Since arguments like Thayer’s draw on
controversial scientific branches of sociobiology and evolutionary psychology, which arguably assume the
basic features of human nature they seek to prove, the conclusions for political theory remain almost as
scientifically arbitrary as Morgenthau’s assumption of an animus dominandi. In framing the problematic of
their exploration, many of these arguments assume an individualistic and egoistic human nature and question
how political relations might arise out of the mechanical dynamics of self-interest. As Mary Clark’s work
demonstrates, this ignores important factors in the evolutionary development of the human being. Since
interpersonal, cultural, political ,and social influences have had a large role in shaping the evolution of
humans and our primate relatives, it is not such a simple task to explain human nature based on rational actor
models and mathematical calculations.
In contrast to the sociobiology and evolutionary psychology’s depiction of human nature as biologically
determined, Clark argues that it is a society’s construction of a ‘story’ of human nature that affects how
people will imagine ways to live together, fulfilling basic human needs or not. Biology is not destiny, she
seems to argue, but what we believe about our biology threatens to become our destiny if we allow it. This
highlights the possibility that seemingly universal traits like competition, aggression and egoism might be
contingent on the weight we lend them and not biologically determined. If we have a choice in the matter,
it is possible to begin conceiving of political possibilities for global social orders that do not depend on a
combative and competitive engagement with Others.
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In turn, this allows a reconsideration of the conceptual lens through which to view security. If it is not
programmed into our genes to be intolerant, ethnocentric, and aggressive, then we can find ways to abandon
the traditions that have normalized such behaviours. Following Jim George and David Campbell, perhaps
a new conception of international relationships would serve better than the current paradigm, which is based
on traditional views of an aggressive and competitive human nature. It may be that, as Clark suggests,
conflict can only be mitigated when basic human needs are met. Doing so, it seems, would require a
rethinking of how differences are engaged with, interpreted and reconciled in both international and local
societies. If we humans are not biologically destined to draw lines between ourselves and others, then it is
possible for us to escape conceptions of security that necessitate aggression against, or protection from,
outsiders. Perhaps the security long sought after in international relations will come not from making
societies secure from difference, but making difference secure within and between states.
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